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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE 
Of 
JOHN BEN MAXFIELD, 
Deceased. 
Case No. 900533 
PRIORITY OF ARGUMENT (16) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, §78-2-2(3) (J) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether joint accounts belong during the lifetime of the 
joint depositors in proportion to the net contribution by each as 
required by Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, §75-6-103(1)? The 
review of questions of statutory construction is plenary. 
Antillon v. Department of Employment Sec, 688 P.2d 455 (Utah 
1984) . 
2. Whether the act of one joint depositor in wrongfully 
withdrawing all funds on deposit, assaulting thereby the interest 
of the other joint depositor, destroys the joint tenancy and 
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extinguishes the right of survivorship? In equity cases appellants 
may appeal on facts as well as law. Adams v. Gubler, 731 P.2d 
494 (Utah 1986) . 
3. Whether property brought into marriage loses its 
character as separate property and becomes marital property by its 
being placed in joint tenancy with the non-contributing spouse 
through various sales and purchases? This legal conclusion of the 
trial court is accorded no particular deference and is subject to 
review by Supreme Court for correctness. Kelson v. Salt Lake 
County, 784 P.2d 1152 (Utah 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
75-6-103* Ownership during lifetime.-(1) A joint account 
belongs, during the lifetime of all parties, to the parties in 
proportion to the net contributions by each to the sums on 
deposit, unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a 
different intent. 
75-2-202. Augmented estate •-(2) (a) For purposes of subsection 
75-2-201(1), "Marital property" means all values included in the 
augmented estate relating to property acquired by the decedent 
subsequent to the most recent marriage to the surviving spouse 
except: (i) property acquired by gift, devise, or descent; (ii) 
- 2 -
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i 
i 
property acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to the 
most recent marriage to the surviving spouse or in exchange for 
property acquired by gift, devise, or descent; and (i i i) the 
increase, rents, issues and profits on property acquired prior to 
the most recent marriage to the surviving spouse, and on property 
described in (i) and (ii). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a final order and findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in proceedings for probate of a will and 
determination of marital property, entered in the District Court 
of Weber County, State of Utah, October 11, 1990, by the Honorable 
Ronald 0. Hyde for the Honorable David E. Roth, ruling as a matter 
of law that separate property brought into marriage by the husband 
lost its character as separate property and became marital 
property by being placed in joint tenancy during the marriage 
through various sales and purchases and that each spouse was 
deemed to have contributed one-half to the jointly owned property. 
(Addenda 1 and 2 hereto attached) • Appellants seek to have the 
trial court's order reversed and all clearly established 
premarital property of John Ben Maxfield and the increase thereto 
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restored to his personal representatives for distribution pursuant 
to his valid last will and testament. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The deceased John Ben Maxfield ("Ben") , a retired real estate 
developer, farmer and former firechief of the U.S. Naval Supply 
Base at Clearfield, Utah, deposited all his earnings and life 
savings to various Ogden Bank of Utah accounts (Tr. 29), which 
included a joint checking account, a joint savings account and 
five joint certificates of deposit, totaling $273,833.60 as of 
November 25, 1986. The joint accounts had been established as 
follows: 
Account Number Joint Owners Amount 
Checking Account J. B. Maxfield or $ 14,178.18 
121 477 4 Louise A. Maxfield 
Savings Account J. B. Maxfield or 10,372.71 
0109-8233 Louise A. Maxfield 
CD 30247 J. B. Maxfield or 66,677.21 
Louise A. Maxfield or 
joy Thornock 
CD 32104 Louise A. Maxfield or 72,489.02 
J. B. Maxfield or 
Stanton LeSieur 
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CD 32911 Louise A. Maxfield or 9,097.11 
J. B. Maxfield or 
Joy Thornock 
CD 34244 J. B. Maxfield or 63,215.00 
Louise A. Maxfield or 
Ben J. Maxfield 
CD 34245 J. B. Maxfield or 37,804.37 
Louise A. Maxfield 
TOTAL $273,833.60 
Although the registration of most of the joint accounts included 
names additional to J. B. Maxfield and Louise A, Maxfield, there 
is no evidence that any party other than J. B. Maxfield and Louise 
A. Maxfield ever contributed funds to the said accounts. 
Cross-appellantf Ben's second wife, Louise A, Maxfield 
("Louise"), maintained several additional savings accounts, 
separate from those with Ben which were jointly owned by her and 
her children by a previous marriage, i.e., Stanton LeSieur, Karen 
Wall and Alice Coffman. (Exhibits 38d, 40d and 41d). One such 
certificate for $12,000.00 was alleged to be an inheritance from 
her aunt. (Tr. 77-78, 118). She also kept her social security 
benefit payments separate from the joint accounts with her 
husband. (Tr. 71). The only separate funds of Louise ever 
deposited to joint accounts with Ben were her take-home pay which 
didn't amount to $9,500 during the marriage. (Tr. 16 and Exhibit 
18d). On November 25, 1986, pursuant to her attorney's 
recommendation, Louise withdrew all funds jointly owned with Ben 
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from the five Bank of Utah certificates totaling $249,282.71, and 
after incurring several thousand dollars in early withdrawal 
penalties, she redeposited $245,235.12 of said funds in six new 
certificates, five of which were registered in Louise's name 
payable on her death as follows: 
Certificate No: POD Designation Amount 
52164 Joy Thornock $30,000.00 
(Ben's daughter) 
52226 Ben J. Maxfield 30,000.00 
(Ben's son) 
52175 Stanton LeSieur 30,000.00 
(Louise's son) 
52227 Alice Coffman 30,000.00 
(Louise's daughter) 
52228 Karen Wall 30,000.00 
(Louise's daughter) 
The remaining $95,235.12 of the withdrawn joint funds were placed 
in a joint account with Louise and her three children as joint 
owners. (Exhibit 28d). 
On December 1, 1986, the remaining funds owned jointly with 
Ben, savings and checking accounts totaling $24,550.89, were 
closed out by Louise, and the funds thereof transferred to new 
checking and savings accounts jointly owned by Louise and her 
daughter Karen Wall (Exhibits 29d, 30d and 39d), leaving Ben 
totally bereft of any money whatsoever. Two days after the 
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withdrawal of the last funds, Louise executed a will, prepared by 
the attorney who recommended the withdrawals, which left her 
entire estate to her children with no provision for her husband. 
(Exhibit 42d). 
After the discovery by Ben of the loss of his funds and the 
commencement on his behalf of litigation for recovery of the 
funds, Louise's attorney had her execute on February 13, 1987, a 
trust agreement, ostensibly for the protection of both Ben and 
Louise, but directing the trustee "...to pay upon her direction or 
the direction of her attorney in fact any and all sums requested 
by Mrs. Maxfield." Also, unless otherwise directed, "...the 
trust income, rents, issues and profits arising from this 
trust..." were to be paid to Louise. (Exhibit lp). The trust 
agreement was revoked by stipulation and court order dated May 18, 
1987, and all funds withdrawn by Louise were ordered to "...be 
deposited with Bank of Utah as special conservator of the Estate 
of John B. Maxfield." Distributions by the special conservator 
were to be made for the reasonable "living expenses of John B. 
Maxfield and Louise A. Maxfield." (Addendum 3 hereto attached and 
Exhibit 2p). That stipulation and court order also provided that 
the three legal proceedings, spawned by Louise's wrongful 
withdrawal of the joint accounts, i.e., for appointment of a 
conservator, for conversion of Ben's funds and for divorce, were 
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all merged by said court order into the divorce proceeding which 
was ultimately dismissed January 25, 1989, because of the physical 
disability of Ben to testify. (Exhibits 2p and 3p). Ben died 
December 3, 1989, at the age of 79 years. (Exhibit 48d). 
Simultaneously with the commencement of the divorce action 
Ben executed an inter vivos trust and pour-over will which 
provided for the payment of $600.00 per month to his wife Louise 
for her lifetime (Exhibit 43d), a monthly sum roughly equivalent 
to his combined retirement and social security benefits, to 
portions of which Louise would also be entitled at Ben's death. 
These documents were executed March 26, 1987, four months after 
Louise's withdrawal of his funds, and they were never modified or 
revoked. In other words, Ben provided that Louise would receive 
after his death $600.00 per month from his trust in addition to 
the residuals of his federal employee's annuity and social 
security payments. 
As part of Louise's resistance to Ben's divorce action, she 
required a mental evaluation of Benf claiming that he had 
"deterioration of the brain"; however, the examining physician 
found Ben competent to make a will and to prosecute his divorce 
action. (Tr. 97). During the examination Ben asserted to the 
physician his reason for the divorce action, "[M]y wife took all 
my money." (Tr. 58-62 and Exhibit 4p). 
- 8 -
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At the time of their marriage, September 7, 1961, Louise's 
assets included a small residence, $1,200.00 and an annual income 
of less than $1,000.00 from which she was supporting herself and 
two minor daughters. (Tr. 9, 21 and Exhibit 18d-1961 1040). On 
the other hand, Ben's premarital assets included three houses in 
Harrisville, a fifty acre farm, fifty percent of the stock in 
Hisfield Gravel Company, a seller's escrow and multiple building 
lots. All these assets were debt-free when he married Louise. 
(Tr. 127) . 
His gross cash receipts in the year of their marriage 
included $3,600.00 in salary from Hisfield, escrow payments of 
$1,094.76 and $2,500.00 from the sale of a building lot, totaling 
$6,378.91, much of which was sheltered from income tax by business 
and farm expenses. (Exhibit 18d-1961 1040). The disparity in 
income of the spouses simply magnified during the 25 years prior 
to their separation which occurred four days after Louise closed 
out the joint accounts. Louise's W-2 Forms reveal income for 
only eleven years of the marriage, her highest annual income being 
$1,535.69 in 1963, her lowest being $499.20 in 1969 and her annual 
average for the eleven year period being less than $1,000.00. 
Her total take-home pay during the entire marriage didn't total 
$9,500.00. (Exhibit 18d). 
- 9 -
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The trial exhibits reveal clearly Ben's, or his Hisfield 
Gravel Company's, ownership of the following assets prior to his 
marriage to Louise: 
Exhibit Date Acquired 
Number Property Description By Ben 
57d 3 Harrisville houses and 2 1/2 January 4, 1944 
acres, located at 1984 
Harrisville Road, acquired 
from Annie Maxfield. 
(Tr. 145-146). 
57d Harrisville farm (approximately June 23, 1956 
50 acres) acquired from James E. 
and Stella Harmston. 
56d 50% interest in 160 acres, April 19, 1952 
conveyed to Hisfield Gravel 
for development of Rolling 
Hills subdivision. 
(Tr. 27-28) . 
lip and 23d 368 Collins acquired from December 16, 1959 
Ray Wesley and Joyce 
Elaine Moss. 
14p 2071 Lane, Lot 14, Block 16, September 4, 1963 
Plat lfBM , Ogden City, 
distributed from Hisfield 
Gravel Company to John B. 
Maxfield. 
15p Lots 15, 16 and 17, Block 9, March 16, 1967 
Rolling Hills Addition No. 5, 
Ogden City, distributed to 
John B. Maxfield from Hisfield 
Gravel Company during its 
liquidation. 
From six sales of property, subdivided from his Harrisville 
properties, Ben received $42,000.00 in gross receipts as follows: 
- 10 -
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Exhibit Parcel 
Date Number Description 
09/12/61 57d 11-023-0002 
12/15/64 57d and lOp 11-023-0023 
05/13/68 57d and 9p 11-023-0003 
05/21/69 57d 11-023-0021 
04/04/60 57d 11-023-0011 
01/26/62 57d 11-023-0010 
Buyers 
Veron E. and 
Bonnie Lee Moss 
Douglas B. and 
Patricia Eggleston 
Lynn W. and 
Shanna Lee Edwards 
Lawrence R. and 
Shirley Nye 
George L. and 
Karlene Knight 
Grant Z. and 
Annie I. Stephens 
le properties 
Sales 
Pr ice 
$ 2,500 
16,000 
8,000 
2,500 
2,000 
11,000 
$4 2,000 
From sales of his Ogden City properties, derived principally 
from his investment in Hisfield Gravel Company, Ben grossed an 
additional $105,850.00, bringing to $147,850.00 his total gross 
receipts from sales of his debt-free premarital properties. The 
only reinvestment of any portion of these funds during his 
marriage to Louise was their placement in joint bank accounts with 
Bank of Utah. The following is a summary of Ben's Ogden City 
property sales: 
Exhibit Parcel Sales 
Date Number Description Buyers Price 
03/01/60 lip and 23d Lot 1, Block 1, George H. and $ 8,000 
El Rancho, Ogden Donna G. Eastman 
City. 
- 11 -
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Steve C. and 
Glenda L. Packer 
Fife Equipment 
3,700 
80,000 
07/28/64 14p, 56d Part of Lot 4, Richard and 6,500 
and 18d Block 16, Plat B Ethel Lou Sober 
(1964 1040) Ogden City, 
2071 Lane 
07/10/67 56d Lot 15, Block 9, Dale W. and 4,000 
Rolling Hills Linda Stoker 
Ogden City. 
04/19/68 56d Lot 17, Block 9, Huffman and Fiet 3,600 
Rolling Hills, 
Ogden City. 
11/02/70 56d, 15p, Lot 16, Block 9, 
and 18d Rolling Hills 
(1970 1040) Ogden City. 
06/01/73 56d 64.87 acres in 
NE 1/4 Section & Investment Co. 
22, T6N, R1W. 
Total sales of Ogden City properties $105,850 
After his marriage to Louise Ben acquired three properties 
with Louise as a joint tenant at a total cost of $27,000.00. To 
complete the largest of these three purchases in 1964, the Costley 
property, a $16,900.00 Bank of Utah loan was obtained, adding to 
the couple's previous Bank of Utah indebtedness of $5,000.00 on a 
promissory note secured by Ben's separate property. (Exhibits 8p, 
21d and 15p). This total indebtedness was retired from proceeds 
derived from the sales of said jointly acquired properties, 
totaling $43,700.00 and resulting in a gross profit of $16,700.00, 
as follows: 
- 12 -
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E x h i b i t Date Date P u r c h a s e S a l e s 
Number D e s c r i p t i o n Acqu i red Sold Buyers P r i c e P r i c e P r o f i t 
7p and H e l l e w e l l 1 /26 /62 4 / 2 5 / 6 2 Sevy $4 ,000 $7 ,500 $3 ,500 
20d 
8p and C o s t l e y 2 / 1 3 / 6 4 15 ,000 
2Id 4 / 2 2 / 6 4 Owen 13 ,400 
1 1 / 1 0 / 6 4 N i e l s e n 3,700 
5 /22 /64 H a n z l i k 3 ,500 
8 /22 /67 Owen 3,600 9 ,200 
22d Campkin 5 / 8 / 7 5 6 / 3 / 7 5 Bice 8 ,000 12 ,000 4 ,000 
Total sales of jointly 
acquired property $27,000 $43,700 $16 ,700 
On or about October 31, 1969, Louise received from her 
father, William P. Arbon, a warranty deed for his residence. 
According to the Maxfields1 1974 1040 income tax return Louise 
apparently paid her brothers $5,000.00 from the sale proceeds for 
their two-thirds interest in said property. Consequently, her 
share of the sale proceeds was approximately $4,000.00. (Exhibit 
18d-1973 1040). From Louise's testimony it is fair to infer 
that the deposit of her share in "Salt Lake City" was not to the 
Ogden joint accounts with her husband, but to accounts kept 
separate from his funds in a manner similar to her inheritance 
from her aunt. (Tr. 118). 
By warranty deed dated November 26, 1985, Ben and Louise, as 
joint tenants, conveyed Louise's residence to Louise and her three 
children as joint tenants with right of survivorship. On that 
same day Ben, individually, executed a warranty deed of his farm 
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to himself and his two children as joint tenants with right of 
survivorship. Both deeds were recorded by Louise. (Exhibits 44d 
and 45d) . 
In summary, the trial exhibits clearly reveal, first, that 
Ben received $147,850.00 in gross receipts from sales of his 
separate property acquired prior to his marriage to Louise, which 
funds together with his retirement annuity and social security 
payments were deposited in the joint accounts at Bank of Utah; 
second, that gross profits from properties acquired and sold 
jointly during the marriage totalled only $16,700.00, which funds 
were also deposited in the joint bank accounts at Bank of Utah; 
and third, that Louise received an inheritance of $12,000.00 from 
an aunt, $4,000.00 from the sale of her one-third interest in her 
father's residence and monthly social security benefits, none of 
which were ever deposited to the joint accounts with Ben. The 
only separate funds of Louise, that were allegedly deposited to 
the joint accounts with Ben, were the less than $9,500 received by 
Louise in take-home pay prior to 1972. (Tr. 16 and Exhibit 18d). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The respective interests of Ben and Louise in the joint 
accounts should have been determined pursuant to the provisions of 
- 14 -
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Utah Code Ann, 1953, as amended, §75-6-103(1), not by the trial 
court's arbitrary determination that each spouse had contributed 
one-half to the accounts, Louise's wrongful withdrawal of all 
the joint accounts destroyed the joint tenancy therein and 
extinguished any right she had to survivorship in the funds which 
may have existed prior to her wrongful conduct. The true 
ownership of the funds, as a matter of statutory law, should have 
been determined by the amounts each spouse had contributed to the 
joint accounts. 
Ben's separate property, acquired prior to his marriage to 
Louise, did not lose its character as separate property by being 
placed in joint tenancy or being exchanged for contracts and money 
which was ultimately placed in joint bank accounts with Louise. 
Section 75-2-202(2)(a), Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, if 
properly applied to the widow's claim in the instant case, would 
expressly exclude from "marital property" Ben's premarital 
property, property exchanged therefor and the increase thereto, 
all of which comprised nearly all of Ben's joint accounts after 
his marriage to Louise. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I; THE JOINT ACCOUNTS WERE OWNED DURING THE LIFETIME 
OF BEN AND LOUISE IN DIRECT PROPORTION TO THE NET CONTRIBUTION BY 
EACH TO THE SUMS ON DEPOSIT. 
- 15 -
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A series of cases decided by this Court from 1941 to 1974 
developed the rule that a presumption of joint ownership arises 
when funds are deposited in joint bank accounts while the 
depositors are alive, but such presumption was rebuttable by clear 
and convincing evidence to the contrary. Neill v. Royce, 101 Ut. 
181, 120 P.2d 327 (1941); Greener v. Greener, 116 Ut. 571, 212 
P.2d 194 (1949); First Security Bank of Utah v. Demiris, 10 
Ut.2d 405, 354 P.2d 97 (1960); Braegger v. Loveland, 12 Ut.2d 
177, 367 P.2d 177 (1961); Tangren v. Ingalls, 12 Ut.2d 388, 367 
P.2d 179 (1961); McCullough v. Wasserback, 30 Ut.2d 398, 518 P.2d 
691 (1974). In 1975, however, this rule was supplanted by Utah 
Code Ann. 1953, as amended, §75-6-103(1), which defined ownership 
of joint accounts during the lifetime of the depositors to be 
"...in proportion to the net contributions by each to the sums on 
deposit, unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a 
different intent." 
The trial court, although mentioning §75-6-103 (Tr. 235)
 f 
refused to apply the statute to the instant case because of the 
following erroneous view of the evidence: 
Property was placed in joint tenancy. It was turned over 
several times. And I find that the bulk of the property 
lost its character as separate property. (Tr. 236). 
This conclusion is not supported by the evidence. The trial 
exhibits, especially the income tax returns, indicate clearly that 
- 16 -
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the "bulk" of the funds remained in Bank of Utah from the time of 
their deposit until their wrongful withdrawal by Louise and were 
never "turned over several times", (Exhibit 18d) . 
Louise's separate funds, with the possible exception of some 
residue of her less than $9,500 take-home pay during the first 
eleven years of their marriage, were all kept separate from the 
joint accounts with Ben. Her inheritance from an aunt, her share 
of the proceeds from the sale of her father's home and her social 
security payments were never deposited to the joint accounts with 
Ben. (Tr. 71, 118). The "bulk" of the joint deposits was clearly 
derived from sale proceeds of Ben's premarital properties, the 
accrued interest thereon and his retirement and social security 
benefits. (Tr. 27-31). 
A safe assumption is that the $16,700 gross profit from the 
sale of jointly acquired real estate was deposited to Ben's joint 
accounts. It should be noted, however, that most of that post-
marital investment in real estate was made by means of bank loans, 
not savings withdrawals. Of the $27,000 invested in said real 
estate during the marriage $21,900 were derived from two bank 
loans of $5,000 and $16,900. (Exhibits 15p, 8p and 21d). 
Consequently, each spouse should be deemed to have contributed to 
the joint Bank of Utah accounts one-half of said profit, or 
$8,350, the only sum other than the residue of her take-home pay, 
- 17 -
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which can actually, or presumptively, be attributed to Louise as 
contributions to the joint bank accounts with Ben. The deposits 
of Louise's take-home pay to the joint accounts with Ben are 
really an insignificant factor when compared to Ben's greater 
deposits of his annuity payments and other income through all 
years of the marriage, not just eleven years thereof. 
Admittedly, the bulk of the joint accounts came from real 
estate sales totaling $191,550. All of this total, except the 
said joint profit of $16,700, was clearly derived from sales of 
Ben's premarital real estate. His share therefore of these total 
sale proceeds can be determined by subtracting Louise's one-half 
of the profit from the sales of jointly acquired realty, or 
$8,350.00. The remainder, $174,850, is clearly the amount 
contributed by Ben, totalling over ninety percent of the total 
sale proceeds deposited to the joint accounts. This contributive 
share of Ben was augmented by deposits of his retirement and 
social security payments and accumulated interest. On the other 
hand, Louise's contribution to the same accounts, $8,350 or one-
half of the profit from the sales of jointly acquired real estate, 
could not have amounted to ten percent of the funds contributed to 
the joint accounts. Consequently, if the trial court had 
properly applied §75-6-103(1) in the instant case, Ben's ownership 
of the joint accounts would have been at least ninety percent 
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< 
i 
thereof, not the arbitrary fifty-fifty division ordered by the 
trial court. 
i 
POINT II: LOUISE'S WRONGFUL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL JOINT DEPOSITS 
ASSAULTED THE INTERESTS OF THE OTHER JOINT DEPOSITORS, THEREBY 
DESTROYING ANY JOINT TENANCY AND EXTINGUISHING THE RIGHT OF 
SURVIVORSHIP, 
During the trial the court declared "...that it was wrong for ' 
her to withdraw the entire amount of all accounts at the time and 
in the manner that she did...." (Tr. 234). The court logically 
concluded that Louise "...lost the right to claim her survivorship 
interest in joint accounts when she withdrew the money from those 
accounts, and the character of those accounts was changed." (Tr. 
233). These statements by the trial court comport to the 
generally held rule that one joint tenant cannot destroy the 
interest or estate of the other. 20 AM. JUR. 2d Cotenancy and 
joint Ownership §2 (1965), p. 93. One who knowingly disposes of 
the property of another has been characterized by this court as a 
"conscious wrongdoer", Park v. Zions First Nat. Bank, 673 P.2d 
590, at 603 (1983), and in a case not very dissimilar to the 
present case has stated , 
Looking at the matter through the eyes of equity it 
seems indisputable that defendant's act of grabbing the 
money at the earliest opportunity was for the purpose of 
getting it for herself and excluding the cotenant 
therefrom; and that this was a wrongful act which should 
not be rewarded. Under such circumstances the court 
- 19 -
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should look beyond the superficiality of the form in 
which the money was held and determine the true facts as 
to its ownership. First Security Bank of Utah v. 
Demiris, 10 Ut.2d 405, 394 P.2d 97, at 99 (1960). 
Integral to this holding is the destruction of the joint tenancy 
and right of survivorship to prevent the wrongful act from being 
rewarded by unjust enrichment. 
It should be noted in the instant case, however, that Louise 
was but one of several joint owners in most of the joint funds 
wrongfully withdrawn. Consequently, the net effect of Louise's 
wrongful conduct was to open the question of true ownership of the 
funds on deposit which must be determined pursuant to the 
statutory requirement of looking to the respective contributions 
of the codepositors as required by §75-6-103(1) . The Editorial 
Board Comment, following this code section, states, 
Presumably, overwithdrawal leaves the party making the 
excessive withdrawal liable to the beneficial owner as a 
debtor or trustee. 
For Louise to be declared the owner of one-half of all the funds 
wrongfully withdrawn, regardless of her contribution thereto, is 
not only unjust, but is contrary to a Utah statute designed to 
protect against such misconduct — not reward it. 
The trial court erred by failing to determine the true 
ownership of the funds on deposit as required by Utah law, which 
error has permitted Louise to be unjustly enriched with Ben's 
money, totally contrary to his expressed intention and desire. 
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POINT III; PROPERTY BROUGHT INTO THE MARRIAGE BY BEN DID NOT 
LOSE ITS CHARACTER AS SEPARATE PROPERTY AND BECOME MARITAL 
PROPERTY BY BEING PLACED IN JOINT TENANCY THROUGH VARIOUS SALES 
AND PURCHASES. 
To affirm the trial court's second conclusion of law, "[T]hat 
the property brought into marriage was converted to joint 
ownership through various sales and purchases thereby losing its 
character as separate property and becoming marital property to 
which each spouse is deemed to have contributed one-half", 
(Addendum 2 hereto attached) is tantamount to negating not only 
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, §75-6-103(1), but also the 
statutory definition of "marital property" set forth in Utah Code 
Ann. 1953, as amended, §75-2-202(2)(a). This latter 1977 code 
section expressly excludes from marital property, 
(ii) property acquired in exchange for property acquired 
prior to the most recent marriage to the surviving 
spouse... and (iii) the increase, rents, issues, and 
profits on property acquired prior to the most recent 
marriage to the surviving spouse.... 
In divorce actions property acquired before marriage, or by 
inheritance or gift, has been generally considered separate 
property and excluded from marital property, unless the other 
spouse has augmented, maintained or protected the property, or the 
parties have "inextricably commingled" the separate property with 
marital property, losing thereby its separate character. Burke v. 
Burke, 733 P.2d 133 (Utah 1987); Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah 
App. 1990). In Burt the court stated, "Conversion from one 
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investment medium to another does not, by its self, destroy the 
integrity of segregation." _Id. at 1169. Present in the instant 
case, however, is no evidence that Louise did anything to augment, 
maintain or protect the joint accounts. In fact, her conduct was 
to the contrary of augmenting, maintaining and protecting them. 
She kept her separate funds from deposit to the accounts, made 
substantial personal withdrawals therefrom without the knowledge 
or consent of her husband and wasted $6,000 thereof in early 
withdrawal penalties. (Tr. 52, 67-70). Also, it is a far stretch 
of imagination to conclude that funds deposited in any joint bank 
account have been "inextricably commingled". 
Of particular significance in the instant case is the fact 
that there were no joint accounts between the spouses, Ben and 
Louise, from the time Louise wrongfully attempted to convert all 
the funds to her personal ownership in 1986 until the time of 
Ben's death, December 3, 1989. Louise's absolute control of the 
funds in her new separate accounts continued until May 22, 1987, 
when they were ordered pursuant to stipulation to be "...deposited 
with Bank of Utah as special conservator of the Estate of John B. 
Maxfield." (Exhibit 2p). On two separate occasions the district 
court allowed special distributions to Louise from her husband's 
conservatorship for purposes other than her living expenses, 
subject on both occasions to her paying back to the conservator 
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the special distributions if they exceeded "the value of her 
interest in the conservatorship". (Exhibits 49d and 50d). 
After Ben's death Louise's objection to the probate of his 
will contained a claim against his estate for "statutory spouse 
allowances and marital shares". (Paragraph 13 of Addendum 4 hereto 
attached). His will poured any probate estate over to the 
trustees of his inter vivos trust for distribution of $600.00 per 
month to Louise for her lifetime and for distribution of the 
balance of the trust estate equally to his two children. (Exhibit 
43d). After the trial court's finding that Ben's will was.valid, 
Louise's claim was for an elective share under Utah Code Ann. 
1953, as amended, §75-2-201, in reference to which the Editorial 
Board Comment, immediately preceding said code section, is 
particularly informative, 
The surviving spouse rather than the executor or the 
probate court has the burden of asserting an election, 
as well as the burden of proving the matters which must 
be shown in order to make a successful claim to more 
than he or she has received. 
In other words, it was Louise's burden to prove the amount, if 
any, of any marital property, or augmented estate, to which she 
made claim. The statute limits "marital property" generally to 
"...property acquired by the decedent subsequent to the most 
recent marriage to the surviving spouse...." Utah Code Ann. 1953, 
as amended, §75-2-202(2)(a). It specifically excludes premarital 
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property and property exchanged for premarital property. Ibid. 
The only "marital property" in the instant case was 
comprised of the spouse's earnings from employment and the three 
parcels of jointly acquired real estate which were acquired for 
$27f000 and sold for $43f700, resulting in a joint profit of 
$16,700. One-half of this profit, $8,350, should properly be 
deemed to be Louise1s contribution to marital property. Ben's 
one-half share should also be deemed marital property to which 
Louise should have a valid elective share claim to one-third of 
his $8,350, the other one-half interest in the marital property, 
and the increase thereon. In total dollars her claim should be 
limited to $8,350 plus $2,783.33, increased by a reasonable 
interest accrual from the respective dates of sale of the 
Hellewell, Costley and Campkin properties, the only properties 
acquired by purchase during the marriage that were not previously 
owned by Ben nor received by gift or inheritance. 
The trial court erred in concluding that the separate 
property of the husband had become marital property by being 
placed in joint tenancy and "turned over several times". (Tr. 
236). That simply did not happen in the instant case. Of the 
total sale proceeds of $191,550 received during the marriage, only 
$5,100 could be deemed to have been reinvested in jointly acquired 
real property. Although the total sum invested jointly during 
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t h e m a r r i a g e was $ 2 7 , 0 0 0 , $21 ,900 of s a i d sum were d e r i v e d from 
joint bank borrowings, secured primarily by Ben's separate 
properties. (Exhibits 8p, 21d and 15p). The difference between ^ 
the total cost of the three jointly acquired properties, $27,000, 
and the $21,900 in purchase loans, the sum of only $5,100, is all 
that could possibly be deemed to have been "turned over" funds.
 { 
All other real estate sale proceeds were deposited to Bank of Utah 
accounts and never reinvested in any medium other than renewed 
saving certificates at Bank of Utah in various family names.
 { 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the trial court should be reversed and all
 { 
clearly established premarital property of Ben with its increase 
should be restored to his personal representatives for 
distribution pursuant to his valid last will and testament.
 { 
Dated this 13th day of March, 1991. 
PARKER, THORNLEY & CRITCHLOW 
VtilXrwr^J. Critchlow, III 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that four copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLANTS were mailed postage prepaid this 13th day of March, 
1991, to R. Stephen Marshall, Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & 
McCarthy, 50 South Main Street, Suite 1600, P.O. Box 45340, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84145. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM 1 
ADDENDUM 2 
ADDENDUM 3 
ADDENDUM 4 
ORDER of District Court, dated October 11, 1990. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, dated 
October 11, 1990. 
STIPULATION AND ORDER of District Court, dated May 
22, 1987. 
AMENDED OBJECTION TO APPLICATION FOR INFORMAL 
PROBATE, AND PETITION FOR DETERMINATION IF THERE 
ARE ASSETS COMPRISING AN ESTATE AND PETITION FOR 
FORMAL PROBATE AND APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE, dated May 10, 1990. 
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BRUCE W. STRATFORD, 4922 
Attorney at Law 
1218 First Security Bank Bldg. 
Ogden, Utah, 84401 
Telephone: 621-6863 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE ) O R D E R 
OF ) 
JOHN BEN MAXFIELD ) PROBATE NO. 893917225 ES 
JUDGE: DAVID E. ROTH 
The above entitled cause came on regularly for 
hearing on the 11th and 12th days of June, 1990, Factual 
determinations having been made pursuant to said hearing and 
the Court having entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, now enters its Order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
the withdrawal by Louise A. Maxfield, one joint tenant, of 
money from the joint accounts causes the loss of the right 
to claim a survivorship interest in the joint accounts. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
the property brought into marriage was converted to joint 
ownership through various sales and purchases thereby losing 
its character as separate property and becoming marital 
property to which each spouse is deemed to have contributed 
one-half. 
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i 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
the farm property owned individually by John Ben Maxfield 
prior to the marriage and retained as separate property 
during the marriage is non-marital property, except to the 
extent that acreage was added to the farm during the 
marriage. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
the residence of a Louise A. Maxfield acquired prior to the 
marriage and retained as separate property during the 
marriage is nonmarital property, 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
the will properly executed by a John Ben Maxfield, a 
competent testator, under no undue influence is a valid last 
will and testament. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
Louise A. Maxfield, the surviving widow is entitled to one-
half of the marital money in the Special Conservator (Trust) 
Account, subject, however, to a credit and charge for 
payment of attorney fees in the sum of $12,130.60, credit 
and charge for home improvements in the sum of $5,299.07, 
credit, and subject to a credit, and charge for th $14,139.18 
withdrawn from the checking account on December 1, 1986, 
offset by the amounts redeposited with the Special 
Conservator and the amounts used for the benefit of John Ben 
Maxfield. The early withdrawal penalties, in the sum of 
$6,349.53 incurred by withdrawal of the joint accounts on 
November 26, 1986 be credited to the Special Conservator 
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(Trust) account and charged one half against the share of 
Louise and one half agains the remaining funds passing to 
Ben J. Maxfield and Joy M. Thornock as Personal 
Representatives of the Estate of John Ben Maxfield, 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
Ben J, Maxfield, a debtor of the estate, and Special 
Conservator (Trust) Account is required to pay the balance 
owed on the loan from John Ben Maxfield to the Special 
Conservator, 
// day of (j/Ct 1990 
BY THE COURT 
Dated this 
^/RONALD 0, HYDE 
^ 0)AVID E. ROTH 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Approved as to form: 
^ ^ ^ £^-Willi/rfn ^ r c r i t c h l o w , I II 
Attorney for Ben J. Maxfield and 
Joy M, Thornock 
SrATEOKUTAH } ~ . 
COUNTY OF WE3ER) 
I Hcro^v Certify That Thir 'c A TA»Q Copy 
DATED TH.^.O^Y cy..lv:s...:\sZz* 
tj$n 
A ^ ^ r M ^ / ^ i i r 
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BRUCE W. STRATFORD, 4922 
Attorney at Law 
1218 First Security Bank Bldg. 
Ogden, Utah, 84401 
Telephone: 621-6863 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE ) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
OF ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
JOHN BEN MAXFIELD ) PROBATE NO. 893917225 ES 
JUDGE: DAVID E. ROTH 
The above entitled cause came on regularly for 
hearing on the 11th and 12th days of June, 1990, on the 
objection of Louise A. Maxfield, Widow of John Ben Maxfield, 
deceased, with Bruce W. Stratford and Dale E. Stratford 
appearing on behalf of Louise A. Maxfield, and with William 
J. Critchlow, III and Richard H. Thornley appearing on 
behalf of Ben J. Maxfield and Joy M. Thornock; witnesses on 
behalf of the parties were sworn and examined, and evidence, 
both oral and documentary, was introduced on behalf of the 
respective parties, and the evidence having been duly taken 
and heard, the cause was argued by counsel for the 
respective parties; and the Court now being duly advised as 
to all the matters and issues involved in the proceeding, 
makes and files the following findings of fact and 
conclusions of law: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Court finds: 
1. Louise A. Maxfield withdrew the money from 
joint accounts and thereby lost the right to claim a 
survivorship interest in the joint accounts. 
2. The bulk of the property brought into the 
marriage by John Ben Maxfield lost its character as separate 
property and became marital property to which each 
contributed one-half (1/2). 
3. The farm of John Ben Maxfield was his 
separate, non-marital property, except to the extent that 
acreage was added to the farm during the marriage. 
4. The residence of Louise A. Maxfield is her 
separate, non-marital property. 
5. John Ben Maxfield was competent at the time he 
executed his Last Will and Testament. 
6. No undue influence was exerted on John Ben 
Maxfield, either by his children or his attorney. 
7. The Last Will and Testament of John Ben 
Maxfield is valid and should be admitted to probate and 
decedent's estate be governed by said will and the trust 
which is the major beneficiary of the will. 
8. Louise A. Maxfield is entitled to one-half 
(1/2) of the sums in the Special Conservator (Trust) Account 
at the Bank of Utah with the following modifications: 
a. She will be charged and credited for the 
withdrawal of attorney fees, in the total sum of $12,130.60 
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b. She will be charged and credited for amounts 
for home improvements, in the total sura of $5,299*07; 
c. She will be charged and credited for the 
$14,139.18 withdrawn from the checking account on December 
1, 1986, offset by the amounts redeposited with the Special 
Conservator and the amounts used for the benefit of John Ben 
Maxfield. 
(d) The early withdrawal penalties in the sum of 
$6,349.53 incurred by withdrawal of the joint accounts on 
November 26, 1986 be credited to the special conservator 
(Trust) account and charged one half against the share If 
Louise and one half against the remaining funds passing to 
Ben J. Maxfield and Joy M. Thornock as Personal 
Representatives of the Estate of John Ben Maxfield. 
9. Ben J. Maxfield shall be required to repay to 
the Special Conservator the balance due on his loan from 
John Ben Maxfield. That the balance due from Ben J. Maxfield 
shall be added into the Special Conservator (Trust) Account 
prior to the division of the account. 
10. Ben J. Maxfield and Joy M. Thornock are 
entitled to Letters Testamentary under the Last Will and 
Testament of John Ben Maxfield dated March 26, 1987. 
11. As personal representatives of said estate of 
John Ben Maxfield, Deceased, Ben J. Maxfield and Joy M. 
Thornock are entitled to receive all remaining funds of the 
John Ben Maxfield Special Conservatorship (Trust) Account at 
Bank of Utah, after distribution by the Conservator to 
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Louise A. Maxfield of her distributive share as hereinabove 
described. Which residual funds being remitted to Ben J 
Maxfield and Joy M. Thornock as Personal Representatives of 
said estate are to be managed and governed pursuant to the 
provisions of the Will and Intervivos Trust of John Ben 
Maxfield. 
12. After making its final account and the 
distributions of the adjusted share of the conservatorship 
funds to Louise A. Maxfield and the remaining balance 
thereof to Ben J. Maxfield and Joy M. Thornock, as personal 
representatives of the estate of John Ben Maxfield, 
deceased, Bank of Utah shall be discharged as special 
conservator, said Conservator being entitled to its accrued 
and unpaid Conservatorship fee at the time of discharge. 
From the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT the Court 
makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the withdrawal by Louise A. Maxfield, one 
joint tenant, of money from the joint accounts causes the 
loss of the right to claim a survivorship interest in the 
joint accounts. 
2. That the property brought into marriage was 
converted to joint ownership through various sales and 
purchases thereby losing its character as separate property 
and becoming marital property to which each spouse is deemed 
to have contributed one-half. 
A / ^ H i a n H n m O 
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3. That the farm property owned individually by 
John Ben Maxfield prior to the marriage and retained as 
separate property during the marriage is non-marital 
property, except to the extent that acreage was added to the 
farm during the marriage. 
4. That the residence of a Louise A. Maxfield 
acquired prior to the marriage and retained as separate 
property during the marriage is nonmarital property. 
5. That the will properly executed by a John Ben 
Maxfield, a competent testator, under no undue influence is 
a valid last will and testament* 
6. That Louise A. Maxfield, the surviving widow 
is entitled to one-half of the marital money in the Special 
Conservator (Trust) Account, subject, however, to a credit 
and charge for payment of attorney fees in the sum of 
$12,130,60, credit and charge for home improvements in the 
sura of $5,299.07, credit, and subject to a credit and charge 
for th $14,139.18 withdrawn from the checking account on 
December 1, 1986, offset by the amounts redeposited with the 
Special Conservator and the amounts used for the benefit of 
John Ben Maxfield. The early withdrawal penalties, in the 
sum of $6,349.53, incurred by withdrawal of the joint 
accounts on November 26, 1986 be credited to the Special 
Conservator (trust) account and charged one half against the 
share of Louise and one half against the remaining funds 
passing to Ben J. Maxfield and Joy M. Thornock as Personal 
Representatives of the Estate of John Ben Maxfield. 
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7. That Ben <!• Maxfield, a debtor of the estate, 
and Special Conservator (Trust) Account is required to pay 
the balance owed on the loan frora John Ben Maxfield to the 
Special Conservator. 
it* Dated this day of 1990 
BY THE COURT 
Approved as to form: f 
rSil^gg^ 
'6, 'RONALD 0 HYpc 
*a DAVID E. ROTH 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
STA7EOKj ' . " • 
Critchlow, I II 
Attorney for Ben J. Maxfield and 
Joy M. Thornock 
Tnj?Ccpy 
. • ^ i ^ 1 
A , 4 ^ ^ ~ ^ 
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William J . Critchlow, III 
Richard H. Thornley 
PARKER, THORNLEY fc CRITCHLOW 
Attorneys for John B. Maxfield 
2610 Washington Boulevard 
P .O. Box 107 
Ogden, Utah 84402 
Telephone: 399-3303 
HAY 2? 3ioPH.'81 
WEBF..:U.'•-:{:'» CUSM 
RICHARD R.Grtt£NE 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
JOHN B . MAXFIELD, 
STIPULATION AND ORDER 
Civil No. 16448 
The above entitled matter having come on for hearing before the above 
entitled court on the 16th day of April, 1987, the Honorable John F . Wahlquist, 
District Court Judge, presiding. John B. Maxfield was personally present and 
was represented by his counsel, William J . Critchlow, III and Richard H. 
Thornley and Louise A. Maxfield was personally present and was represented by 
her counsel, Bruce W. Stratford; and the said parties entered into the following 
stipulation in open court : 
1. Bank of Utah, Ogden t Utah, shall be appointed special 
conservator of the Estate of John B. Maxfield* 
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2. All funds withdrawn by Louise A. Maxfield from joint accounts oi 
John B. Maxfield, Louise A. Maxfield and others be deposited with Bank of Utah 
as special conservator of the Estate of John B. Maxfield* 
3, An accounting shall be provided by the Bank of Utah and Louise 
A. Maxfield for all funds not delivered to Bank of Utah as special conservator. 
4* The trust established by Louise A. Maxfield with Bank of Utah as 
Trustee shall be revoked in its entirety. 
5. The queston of ownership of the funds delivered to the special 
oonservator and all other funds not delivered to the special conservator but 
which were withdrawn or used from the original joint accounts shall be 
determined in the divorce proceeding between John B. Maxfield and Louise A. 
Maxfield, and all other pending actions between said parties shall be merged in 
the divorce proceeding. 
6* Bank of Utah, as special conservator, shall distribute such sums 
as it shall deem reasonable and proper for the living expenses of John B. 
Maxfield and Louise A. Maxfield until final determination by the court in the 
divorce proceedings. 
1. John B. Maxfield requires some type of nursing home care which 
is to be determined by a letter of recommendation from O. Marvin Lewis. 
8* The care of John B. Maxfield and Louise A. Maxfield is of 
paramount concern and no children or heirs of either party shall in any way 
dispose of any asset of either John B. Maxfield or Louise A. Maxfield. 
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DATED this / / " day of i^dtt, 1987. 
John B. Maxfield 
Xouise A. Max 
S-'f-*7 
Approved as to form: $-5'Z7 
<%'6'-*~7- <r//sAy 
WilliatrJ. Critchlow, III 
Bruc^e W. Stratford 
^
 A/t^4^/ Vs/s? 
ORDER 
Pursuant to the foregoing stipulation and with good cause appearing 
therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. Bank of Utah, Ogden, Utah, is hereby appointed special 
conservator of the Estate of John B. Maxfield. 
2. All funds withdrawn by Louise A. Maxfield from joint accounts of 
John B. Maxfield, Louise A. Maxfield and others shall be deposited with Bank of 
Utah as special conservator of the Estate of John B. Maxfield. 
3. An accounting shall be provided by the Bank of Utah and Louise 
A. Maxfield for all funds not delivered to Bank of Utah as special conservator. 
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4. The trust established by Louise A. Maxfield with Bank of Utah as 
Trustee is hereby revoked in its entirety. 
5. The question of ownership of the funds delivered to the special 
oonservator and all other funds not delivered to the special conservator but 
which were withdrawn or used from the original joint accounts shall be 
determined in the divorce proceeding between John B. Maxfield and Louise A. 
Maxfield, and all other pending actions between said parties shall be merged in 
the divorce proceeding. 
6. Bank of Utah, as special conservator, shall distribute such sums 
as it shall deem reasonable and proper for the living expenses of John B. 
Maxfield and Louise A. Maxfield until final determination by the court in the 
divorce proceedings* 
7. The care facility for John B. Maxfield shall be determined by a 
letter of recommendation from 0. Marvin Lewis. 
8. That the care of John B. Maxfield and Louise A. Maxfield is of 
paramount ooncern and no children or heirs of either party shall in any way 
dispose of any asset of either John B. Maxfield or Louise A. Maxfield, 
A?* 
Dated this 
John F. Wahlquist 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
^ - ^ 
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BRUCE W. STRATFORD, No. 4922 
Attorney at Law 
1218 First Security Bank Bdg. 
Ogden, Utah, 84401 
Telephone: 393-7085 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE 
OF 
JOHN BEN MAXFIELD, 
Deceased 
A M E N D E D 
) OBJECTION TO APPLICATION 
) FOR INFORMAL PROBATE, AND 
) PETITION FOR DETERMINATION 
) IF THERE ARE ASSETS 
) COMPRISING AN ESTATE AND 
PETITION FOR FORMAL PROBATE 
AND APPOINTMENT OF 
) PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
) Probate No. 893917225ES 
Petitioner, LOUISE A. MAXFIELD, by and through her 
attorney, BRUCE W. STRATFORD, hereby amends the prior 
Objection to Application for Informal Probate as follows: 
1. That pursuant to discovery entered into 
concerning the affairs and/or property of the decedent, the 
following assets have been set forth as those in which the 
decedent had an ownership or equitable interest prior to his 
death. 
(a) A farm, located in Harrisville, Weber County, 
Utah, which has an approximately value set by the Weber 
Addendum 4 
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County Assessor of $147,000.00, and various machinery and/or 
a small farm operating fund. 
(b) Monies in a special Conservatorship at the Bank 
of Utah. 
2. That the above named assets are treated by non 
probate transfer provisions of the Utah Code and that a 
determination needs to be made if such non probate transfers 
are valid and effective, as against the estate, and if there 
is an estate to be probated prior to the determination of 
the validity of the purported Will and purported Trust which 
are being admitted to formal probate. 
3. That there were no other assets identified which 
would comprise an estate and if there is no estate, that a 
petition for informal and formal probate be denied. 
4. That if a determination exists that there is an 
estate to be probated, petitioner restates the following: 
1. Petitioners interest in this matter is that of 
the surviving spouse of the decedent. 
2. The decedent, John Ben Maxfield, died on 
December 3, 1989 at the age of 79 years. 
3. Venue is proper because at the time of the death 
the decedent was domiciled in this County. 
4. That the names and addresses of the surviving 
spouse, children, heirs and devisees of the decedent, are: 
NAME ADDRESS RELATIONSHIP 
LOUISE A. MAXFIELD 474 16th Street Surviving spouse 
Ogden, Utah, 84404 
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BEN J. MAXFIELD 1027 N. Harrisville Rd. 
Harrisville, Utah, 84404 Son 
JOY M. THORNOCK 623 East 3450 North 
North Ogden, Utah, 84404 Daughter 
5. Petitioner objects to an informal appointment of 
personal representative and to an informal probate of the 
estate and requests that formal appointment of a personal 
representative and formal probate of the estate be granted. 
6. Petitioner is aware of the filing of the 
Informal Probate and Petitioner hereby makes formal demand 
for notice of any probate or appointment proceedings 
concerning the decedent that may be filed in this State or 
elsewhere by the parties filing the aforesaid Informal 
Probate. 
7. That the time limit for formal probate has not 
expired because less than three years have passed since the 
decedent's death. 
8. The Petitioner acknowledges the existence of a 
document purported to be a Will dated March 27, 1987, 
however, Petitioner requests that such Will be admitted to 
formal probate for determination as to its validity. 
9. Petitioner further asks that the purported 
revocable living trust which is referenced in the Will be 
admitted to Probate for a determination of its validity. 
10. Petitioner further objects to an informal 
probate as the estate involves a prior Court ordered 
Conservatorship in Case No. 09877, which case was heard in 
the aforesaid court on or about the 25th day of January, 
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1989, and which should be referenced to the Probate action 
in the event consideration is given to any testamentary 
documents whatsoever. 
11. That the Petitioner seeks formal appointment as 
the Personal Representative of the Estate in that she is 
entitled to be said Personal Representative pursuant to 
Section 75-3-203.1(b) 
12. That Petitioner requests that any filings for 
informal probate or informal appointment of Personal 
Representative be considered adverse filings to the 
Petitioner and that all legal fees and expenses incurred as 
a result of such filings be paid for by the parties so 
filing and not out of the estate. 
13. Petitioner further petitions that a 
determination be made of marital property and/or other 
properties which would be subject to the statutory spouse 
allowances and marital shares. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner requests as follows: 
1. That a determination be made if there are assets 
comprising an estate of John Ben Maxfield. 
2. That if there are no assets, the application for 
informal probate and formal probate be denied. 
3. That if there are assets that no action of 
informal probate or appointment of Informal Personal 
Representative be issued. 
4. That formal probate and formal appointment of 
Personal Representative occur in the above entitled estate. 
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5. That Petitioner be appointed Personal 
Representative of the estate. 
6. Upon qualification and acceptance of the formal 
probate that Letters Testamentary be issued. 
7. That each and every party bear their own costs 
of Court and attorney fees. 
8. That a determination be made of marital property 
and/or other properties which would be subject to the 
statutory spouse allowances and marital shares. 
DATED this /£ ^ day of May, 1990. 
, - y r ' < / 
BRUCE to. StRATFOI 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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